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Abstract
This paper investigates generalisation in multi-
agent games, where the generality of the agent
can be evaluated by playing against opponents
it hasn’t seen during training. We propose
two new games with concealed information and
complex, non-transitive reward structure (think
rock/paper/scissors). It turns out that most current
deep reinforcement learning methods fail to effi-
ciently explore the strategy space, thus learning
policies that generalise poorly to unseen oppo-
nents. We then propose a novel hierarchical agent
architecture, where the hierarchy is grounded in
the game-theoretic structure of the game – the top
level chooses strategic responses to opponents,
while the low level implements them into policy
over primitive actions. This grounding facilitates
credit assignment across the levels of hierarchy.
Our experiments show that the proposed hierar-
chical agent is capable of generalisation to unseen
opponents, while conventional baselines fail to
generalise whatsoever.
1. Introduction
The outstanding feature of human intelligence is its gener-
ality. Although great strides in deep RL have been made,
agents are often not capable of generalisation beyond trivial
changes in the environment (Leike et al., 2017; Machado
et al., 2018; Cobbe et al., 2019), which limits the practical
impact. Consequently, researchers have begun advocating
borrowing experimental design from supervised learning
with explicitly separated testing and training version of the
environment (Machado et al., 2018; Cobbe et al., 2019;
Racanie`re et al., 2017). In this paper we want to address the
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problem of building agents with general competence over
a wide varieties of tasks, including those not experienced
during training. It is an open question how these tasks could
be created for either training or evaluation. Here we pursue
an avenue for investigating generalisation and problem gen-
eration, which comes from multi-agent research. As argued
in (Leibo et al., 2019), multi-agent systems can display in-
trinsic dynamics arising from competition and cooperation
that provide a naturally emergent and dynamically grow-
ing set of problems. A solution of one multi-agent task
begets a new task, continually generating novel challenges.
Recent success stories like AlphaGo (Silver et al., 2016)
and AlphaStar (Vinyals et al., 2019) have demonstrated gen-
eralisation by playing directly against professional human
players, which they had no experience playing before. Al-
phaStar (Vinyals et al., 2019) has explicitly generated an
ever growing set of opponents to both train and evaluate
the agent against. Although StarCraft is a great challenge,
its computational demands and game complexity can be
prohibitive for fundamental research.
The first contribution of this paper are two grid world
multi-agent games with simple implementation, yet com-
plex multi-agent dynamics with non-transitive reward (think
rock/paper/scissors) and concealed information. We can em-
pirically measure generalisation by playing policies learnt
by different agents against each-other and a pre-trained hold-
out set of policies. If the agent has understood the rules of
the game and explored the space of strategies well, its policy
should fare well against a novel adversary. Our experiments
show that most common deep RL agent architectures (Es-
peholt et al., 2018; Foerster et al., 2018; Lowe et al., 2017)
generalise poorly, even if designed for multi-agent specifi-
cally (Foerster et al., 2018; Lowe et al., 2017).
Our second contribution is a novel hierarchical agent archi-
tecture, which is grounded in the game-theoretic structure
of the game. To discover that structure, we factorise the
value function over a latent representation of the concealed
information and then re-use this latent space to factorise the
policy. Low-level policies (options) are trained to respond
to particular states of other agents grouped by the latent
representation, while the top level (meta-policy) learns to
infer the latent representation from its own observation and
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thereby select the right option. This architecture, coined
OPtions as REsponses (OPRE), generalises better by sep-
arately extracting strategic and tactical knowledge of the
game into separate levels of hierarchy. It then generates
new behaviours by recombining learnt options given an
unfamiliar opponent. Experiments show that OPRE signifi-
cantly outperforms baselines, when evaluated against them
directly or when measured against held-out opponents that
the agents did not see in training.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 in-
troduces multi-agent games with concealed information and
non-transitive reward. Section 3 formulates the hierarchical
approach to solve those domains. We introduce the OPRE
model in Section 3, followed by a review of the related work
in Section 4. Experimental results are presented in Section 5.
We conclude in Section 6.
2. Multi-Agent RL games with concealed and
partial information
Consider a modified game of rock-paper-scissors, where
each strategy (e.g. rock), rather than being executed in one
shot as an atomic action, requires a long sequence of actions
that, taken as a whole, constitutes the chosen strategy. In
keeping with the terminology introduced in (Leibo et al.,
2019), we call such a policy an implementation of the strat-
egy. Both strategic decisions and their implementations
must be learned by reinforcement learning.
We propose two stateful extensions of the classic matrix
game rock-paper-scissors with increasing complexity, called
Running With Scissors (RWS) (Section 2.1) and RPS Arena
(Section 2.2). In these spatialised extensions, players
move around on a 2D grid, only observing a small win-
dow around their current location (the environment is par-
tially observed). They can pick up resources (i.e. rocks,
papers and scissors), which are scattered semi-randomly,
and can confront their opponent(s). Once the confrontation
occurs (via a tagging mechanic) then the payoffs accruing
to each player are calculated according to the standard anti-
symmetric matrix formulation of rock-paper-scissors (see,
e.g., Hofbauer & Sigmund (2003)). In these games, to im-
plement a strategy—say the ‘rock’ pure strategy—an agent
must seek out tiles with rock resources, while avoiding col-
lecting non-rock resources, and then confront an opponent.
RWS is a two-player game with a single reward event at the
end of the episode. RPS Arena is a five-player game with
much longer episodes, more complex dynamics and multi-
ple reward events. Both domains are partially observable,
spatially and temporally extended multi-agent games with
a game-theoretic payoff structure. Contrary to many other
multi-agent studies (Foerster et al., 2018; Lowe et al., 2017;
Ahilan & Dayan, 2019; Hughes et al., 2018), the tasks are
not cooperative (agents do not share a reward signal) and do
not feature a communication channel.
All the rich game theoretic structure of the rock-paper-
scissors game is maintained in RWS and RPS Arena. In ad-
dition, agents also have to cope with the complexity of learn-
ing implementations of strategies. For example, the game’s
intransitive response dynamics (rock beats scissors, which
beat paper, which in turn beats rock), may induce endlessly
recurring cyclic reinforcement learning challenges (Bal-
duzzi et al., 2018; Leibo et al., 2019; Omidshafiei et al.,
2019). Furthermore, because they have imperfect infor-
mation, agents cannot easily figure out their opponent’s
strategy and select the appropriate best response. However,
they have ways to gather information about their opponent’s
intent. In Running With Scissors, agents are able to move
around the map and observe what resources are missing,
implying they were already collected by the adversary. A
reasonable way to play this game is to first attempt to scout
around and determine to what resource the adversary has
committed itself, and to then implement the best response
to that strategy. The crucial point in this setup is that these
strategies (sub-behaviours) are all naturally grounded – the
top level deals with the choice of strategy as a response
to the opponent’s strategy, and the bottom level with its
implementation. They are also precisely what one hopes
would be discovered by any option-discovery hierarchical
reinforcement learning (HRL) algorithm.
2.1. Running with scissors (RWS)
Figure 1 visualises the initial grid configuration of Running
with Scissors.
players
rockscissorspaper
deterministic
placement
Figure 1. Running With Scissors (RWS) illustrated. This is the
initial configuration of the grid. Players spawn at any random
location, except for those occupied by resources. Some resources
are placed deterministically (shown by green rectangles), others
spawn randomly.
Formally, RWS is a Markov game (Littman, 1994) – Markov
games are to matrix games as Markov decision processes
are to bandit problems. The grid has dimensions 13× 21;
each of the two players starts at a random position on the
grid and can observe a 4×4 area around itself. There are 36
evenly spaced resources (i.e. rock, scissors or paper) tiles on
the grid, 18 of which always have the same resource while
others get a random one. When a player steps on a tile with
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the resource, it picks it up – the resource is removed from
the grid and is allocated into the player’s inventory v, which
is initialised to contain one of each resource type.
There are two termination conditions for the episode: i)
timeout of 500 steps or ii) one agent tags another. Tagging
is a special action that highlights a 3 × 3 area in front of
the tagging player and is successful if the other player is
in that area. Which agent was tagged does not matter; the
outcome is the termination of the episode and scoring. The
rewards accruing to each player are calculated as follows:
r0 = v
0
||v0||M
(
v1
||v1||
)T
= −r1, where v0 and v1 are the
respective inventories and M is the anti-symmetric matrix
of the game M = 100·
 0 −1 11 0 −1
−1 1 0
 .
To get a high reward an agent should correctly identify what
resource its opponent is collecting (e.g. rock) and collect a
counter (e.g. paper). In addition, the rules of the game are
not assumed given; the agents must explore to discover them.
Thus it is simultaneously a game of imperfect information—
each player possesses some private information not known
to their adversary (as in e.g. poker (Sandholm, 2015))—and
incomplete information—lacking common knowledge of
the rules (Harsanyi, 1967).
2.2. RPS Arena
players
rockscissorspaper
Figure 2. RPS Arena illustrated. Resources are placed randomly
and re-spawn over time. There are 5 players in total. .
We propose a more challenging version of RWS, coined
RPS Arena, that extends it in the following ways: i) the
world is larger 13× 42 ii) there are 5 players iii) resources
(R/P/S) are scattered randomly and regenerate. The reward
is collected by agents tagging each other — their inventories
reset, the reward is calculated as in RWS but the episode
does not terminate; additionally, the losing agent is ran-
domly teleported and frozen for 50 steps. It is a lot harder
for an agent to predict the inventory of the opponent, since
there are 4 of them now and the map is larger.
2.3. Pre-training hold-out competitors.
To test generalisation we need a held-out set of pre-trained
competitors, which is generated as follows. We trained a
set of 14 agents in simultaneous population-play. 12 of
them were augmented with pseudo-rewards during training
that incentivised them to learn a particular pure strategy (4
per strategy). Incentivised agents receive a pseudoreward
of +10 for collecting each resource of a specific type and
−5 for collecting any other resource. The remaining two
out of the 14 simultaneously learning agents were given
no pseudorewards for robustness. This was done for both
domains.
3. Hierarchical RL for MARL
The key issue in HRL is credit assignment for high-level
choices vs their execution on the low level — if the reward
is low, is this due to a wrong choice of strategy or its faulty
execution? One way to address that is to ground high-level
decisions in something exogenous to the agent, so that the
success or failure of the high-level policy can be inferred
separately from the success or failure of the implementation.
For example, Feudal RL (Dayan & Hinton, 1993; Vezhn-
evets et al., 2017) grounds high-level decisions in the state
of the environment, so the choice of goal state and whether
it was achieved are verifiable independently. Here, for the
multi-agent case we propose to ground the high level in the
concealed state of the opponent(s)—the high level estimates
what that state is and the low level implements a response
to it (e.g. if my opponent is rock, play paper).
To cast the multi-agent learning problem as hierarchical RL,
we build a latent representation, z, of the concealed infor-
mation. The proposed hierarchical agent, OPRE (OPtions
as REsponses), learns a best response policy to a partic-
ular configuration of z at the low level of the hierarchy,
while the top level of the hierarchy estimates z and thereby
picks an option. We learn the latent representation z by fac-
torising the value function over the concealed information
using a mixture model. For training, we assume that we
have access to this concealed information in hindsight for
the purpose of generating learning signal;1 we never use
concealed information to generate any behaviour. This is
similar to hindsight policy gradient (Rauber et al., 2017) and
experience replay (Andrychowicz et al., 2017) and other
counterfactual RL works (Buesing et al., 2019; Foerster
et al., 2018; Lowe et al., 2017). This grounding helps the
agent distinguish between two types of mistakes: i) wrongly
guessing the concealed information, thereby picking an in-
adequate strategy (e.g. rock vs paper) or ii) picking the right
strategy, but executing it poorly.
3.1. Formal definition of MARL
We consider an N -player partially observable Markov game
M defined on a finite set of states S . The observation func-
tion X : S × {1, ..., N} → Rd, specifies each player’s
1This is a reasonable assumption, akin to a sportsman watching
a replay of the game to analyse their play a posteriori. StarCraft
2 players routinely watch replays with opponent play revealed
during championships.
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d-dimensional view on the state space. In each state, each
player i is allowed to take an action from its own set Ai.
Following their joint action (a1, ..., aN ) ∈ A1×...×AN , the
state obeys the stochastic transition function T : S ×A1 ×
...× AN → ∆(S) (∆(S) denotes the set of discrete prob-
ability distributions over S) and every player receives an
individual reward defined as ri : S×A1×...×AN → R for
player i. Finally, let X i = {X (s, i)}s∈S be the observation
space of player i.
Each agent learns independently through their own experi-
ence of the environment by optimising for their own indi-
vidual return, without direct communication to other agents.
Notice that this is different from a large part of the recent
work on multi-agent RL (Foerster et al., 2018; Rashid et al.,
2018; Iqbal & Sha, 2018), where agents are working towards
a common goal by optimising a shared reward (with the no-
table exception of (Lowe et al., 2017), which allows for
cooperative-competitive environments), often coordinating
via an explicit communication channel.
The rest of the paper considers an “egocentric” view of one
of the agents in the environment, thereby we will denote its
observations and actions simply as x and a. The information
concealed from the agent is denoted as x′. Here, we define
it as the observations of all other agents. So for the agent of
interest, x′ =
⋃
xj 6=x x
j .
3.2. OPRE model
This section introduces the OPtions as REsponses (OPRE)
model – a hierarchical agent for multi-agent RL. Figure 3
illustrates the structure of the model which consists of two
parts. The first part (Figure 3, red box on the left) builds
the latent space by factorising the value function over the
concealed information, while the second part (Figure 3, blue
box on the right) re-uses that latent space to factorise the
agent’s policy into options. Both value and policy are mix-
ture models, where a categorical latent variable selects the
mixture component. These mixture models are synchro-
nised via a KL term, which pulls the mixture weights to be
similar in both for each step.
Building the latent space via value function factorisa-
tion. We model the value function of the agent as a mix-
ture model, where the mixture weights q(z|x′t) depend on
the concealed information x′t, while the mixture components
c(x≤t, z) depend on the agent’s own history of observations
x≤t:
Vpi(x≤t, x′t) =
∑
z
q(z|x′t)c(x≤t, z). (1)
Here the latent variable z is assumed to be categorical and
can be marginalised away. This construction compresses
the concealed information into the distribution q(z|x′t) over
the latent space z, but only focusing on the part which is
KLq(z|xt′)
xt′
concealed information
V𝜋=∑zq(z|xt′)c(x≤t ,z)
𝜋
xt 
p(z|x≤t )
agent observation
𝜋    =∑z q(z|xt′)𝜂(a|z,xt )
𝜇  =∑z p(z|x≤t )𝜂(a|z,xt )
𝜇
Figure 3. OPRE illustration. The first module (red box) uses con-
cealed information, available in hindsight, to factorise the value
function and target policy. The second module (blue box) pro-
duces behaviour policy, by approximating the latent distribution q
without using the concealed information.
relevant to representing the value.
Inducing options. The key idea behind OPRE is to re-use
the same latent space to factorise the policy. Consider first
this mixture policy:
pi(a|x≤t, x′t) =
∑
z
q(z|x′t)η(a|x≤t, z), (2)
where η(a|x≤t, z) is a mixture component of the policy – an
option. In this form, an option is a behavioural response to
a particular latent representation z of concealed information
x′. z corresponds to a group of opponent states for which
a certain mixture component is activated (i.e. for which
q(z|x′t) is high). To compute pi(a|x≤t, x′t) the agent needs
to know q(z|x′t), which depends on the concealed informa-
tion x′t. However, by definition, this quantity is not available
to the agent. Therefore, we introduce the behaviour policy,
which approximates it from the agent observation alone:
µ(a|x≤t) =
∑
z
p(z|x≤t)η(a|x≤t, z). (3)
In this way, p(z|x≤t) becomes the policy over options,
which is learned separately as described below.
3.3. Learning
This section describes how to train OPRE agents. We use
an IMPALA (Espeholt et al., 2018) based computational
setup for training all of our agents. A few hundred CPU
actors generate game trajectories, which are then batched
and consumed by a GPU learner (one per unique agent).
The learner receives temporally truncated sequences of 100
steps of trajectories in batches of 16. The parameters are
periodically synced between the actors and the learner. The
concealed information about other agents is only available
to the learner (the actors, which generate behaviour, do not
use concealed information). V-trace is used to correct for
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Algorithm 1 Training OPRE: Actor
1: Input: (N,K) // takes max number of steps and number of
agents
2: while n < N do
3: if time to sync or n = 0 then
4: Θ = {θk}Kk=1 ← Θstep // sync parameters with learner
5: end if
6: i ← random(K), j ← random(K) // draw two agents to
play at random
7: τ ← Play(µθi , µθj ) // generate trajectory by playing be-
haviour policies
8: Queue(τ) // queue the trajectory for the learner
9: n← nlearner // sync learning step counter with the learner
10: end while
Algorithm 2 Training OPRE: Learner
1: Input: (N, k, T,B) // takes max number of steps, agent index,
batch dimensions
2: θ ← random()
3: n← 0
4: while n < N do
5: β ← Dequeue(k,B, T ) // get a batch for a respective agent
of B × T size
6: ∇piθ,∇Vθ ← V-trace(β, θ) // get target policy pi gradients
with V-trace (Espeholt et al., 2018)
7: ∇Reg ← ∇(HT (qθ) − HB(qθ) − H(piθ)) // gradients
from regularisation
8: θ ← BackProp(∇piθ +∇Vθ +∇KL(qθ||pθ) +∇Reg) //
update parameters
9: n← n+ T ·B // increment step
10: end while
off-policy due to the lag of parameter synchronisation on
actors and learners. Algorithm 1 and 2 present pseudo-code
for actor and learner respectively.
Learning the policy over options p(z|x≤t) is done via
minimising KL(q||p). The agent tries to learn the model
of its opponents’ behaviour by approximating q(z|x′t) via
p(z|x≤t). This makes learning the high-level policy straight-
forward, since there is a clearly defined target q for the
policy over options p.
Credit assignment learning options Before we describe
how the set of individual option policies η is learnt, we
first note how the multi-agent aspect complicates credit
assignment. The outcomes the agent is learning from are
the product of complex interactions between its own states
and actions and the states and actions of others. The same
actions by an agent could lead to both high and low reward,
depending on the opponents’ actions. For example, if agent
chooses to play a ‘rock’ strategy against an opponent who
plays ‘paper’, rather than correcting its ‘rock’ option to be
more like ‘scissors’, we only want it to change its decision
to play ‘rock’ in the first place. Flat agents are not capable of
separating these two signals and are likely to cycle between
different strategies, as discussed in (Balduzzi et al., 2019).
We propose to use the policy gradient of pi for training op-
tions, which is computed off-policy via V-trace (Espeholt
et al., 2018) from the trajectories generated by following the
behaviour policy, µ. This is straightforward, since on the
learner we can compute both µ and pi by simply marginal-
ising over z via summation (z is categorical). Importantly,
we do not propagate gradients from the policy gradient into
q, completely leaving its training up to the KL and value
function gradients (also learnt via V-trace). This resolves the
credit assignment by separately learning to credit the policy
over options p for selecting strategies and the options η for
executing them. Indeed, if p is far from q then the off-policy
term from V-trace will dampen the gradient for η and the
only training signal will be the KL between p and q. Again,
we emphasise that we only use the concealed information
x′ for learning and never use it to run the agent’s policy.
This can, potentially, lead to a bias in the policy when p
cannot possibly match q – e.g. the agent’s state does not con-
tain enough information to make the right inference about
the concealed information. As an ablation, we consider a
greedier version of OPRE, in which an additional policy
gradient from the behavioural policy µ is propagated into
η; coined OPRE mix PG. This ablation directly optimises
the behaviour policy µ to maximise reward, while staying
close to the target policy pi, which can be thought of as a
form of regularisation. Peeking ahead, we shall see in the
experiments (Section 5) that this leads to better exploitation
of fixed opponents, but worsens generalisation.
Regularisation. We want to encourage options to be
smooth in time within an episode (switch less) and diverse
across episodes. To this end, we use the following regulari-
sation loss: HT (q)−HB(q)−H(pi). The first two terms
correspond to the maximisation of the marginal entropy of
q over a batch and the minimisation of its marginal entropy
over time. The last term maximises the entropy of the target
policy to encourage exploration and avoid policy collapse.
4. Related work
Using concealed information counterfactually to improve
the critic in multi-agent learning is a technique used in
several recent works (Baker et al., 2019; Vinyals et al., 2019;
Foerster et al., 2018; Lowe et al., 2017). In all of these cases
it is only used simply as an input to the critic. To the best of
our knowledge, OPRE’s hierarchical approach grounded in
concealed information is unique; related works either do not
assume a hierarchy of policies (Foerster et al., 2018; Lowe
et al., 2017; Iqbal & Sha, 2018; Rashid et al., 2018), function
with a centralised manager as top-level (Ahilan & Dayan,
2019), or do not ground their hierarchy in game-theoretic
fashion (Tang et al., 2018).
Several works use counterfactual knowledge and hindsight
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to improve credit assignment in single agent setup (Buesing
et al., 2019; Andrychowicz et al., 2017; Rauber et al., 2017;
Harutyunyan et al., 2019).
We would like to separately note population-based MARL
methods like PSRO (Lanctot et al., 2017; Balduzzi et al.,
2019), which build an iterative procedure on top of the
basic RL method to explore the strategy space and find an
approximate equilibrium. These methods are orthogonal to
what we present here and could be combined with OPRE;
we leave this to future work.
5. Experiments
This section presents the experimental evaluation of OPRE
and several baselines on the domains described in Section 2.
First, we describe the agents2 that we will use as baseline.
Next, we evaluate how the agents perform when trained
directly against a fixed set of pure strategies (Section 5.2).
This setup is, essentially, a multi-task RL problem, where
the task (opponent) is not given and has to be inferred. Here
agents do not have to generalise to unseen opponents, but
need to deal with the non-transitivity of the return and with
concealed information. Section 5.3 evaluates agents trained
in self-play and tested against the held-out pure strategies.
This tests the agents’ generalisation on a clearly defined
benchmark, exogenous to all of them. In Section 5.5 we
analyse agents trained in self-play by playing them against
each other and investigating the resulting pay-off matrix.
Apart from simply declaring a winner, we look at the Nash
equilibrium and effective diversity (Balduzzi et al., 2019).
Given the perceptual simplicity of environments, we use a
very slim architecture for OPRE. The network starts with
a 1D convolutional layer with 6 channels, followed by an
MLP with (64, 64) neurons, then by an LSTM with 128
hidden neurons. We construct 16 policy heads (one for each
η), where each is an MLP with 128 hidden neurons taking
LSTM output as an input. We use the same convolutional
network with another MLP on top to produce q from the
opponent observation (concealed information). The policy
over options p is produced via a linear layer from LSTM
output. For RPS Arena, which has several other agents in
the game, we process each of their observations with the
same convolutional net and then pool using summation.
5.1. Baselines
Our first baseline uses a standard architecture with a convo-
lutional network base and a LSTM on top, with linear policy
and value head (we simply refer to it as Baseline). This is a
strong, off-the-shelf deep RL agent. The second baseline is
based on (Foerster et al., 2018), where a critic has counter-
2We refer to versions of OPRE and the baselines simply as
‘agents’ in the rest of the document.
factual access to concealed information; we call it Baseline
CC. Concealed information is processed in the same way
as in OPRE and then concatenated to the value head’s input.
This is also similar to (Lowe et al., 2017). Both (Foerster
et al., 2018; Lowe et al., 2017) use concealed information
for training, but do not have a hierarchical structure in their
agents. The hyper-parameters were tuned on the RWS task
in the regime of training and evaluating against competitors;
we first tuned the parameters of the baseline, then tuned
the extra hyper-parameters of OPRE. The appendix con-
tainst all hyper-parameters, their values and precise network
parametrisation like layer sizes. There are several specific
ablation of OPRE and extra baselines in Section 5.4, which
are designed to validate specific design choices. We describe
them there.
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RWS RPS Arena
Figure 4. Learning curves for exploiting a fixed set of pure strate-
gies. Left: RWS Right: RPS Arena.
5.2. Exploiting a fixed opponent set
Here we investigate how good the agents are at simply ex-
ploiting a fixed set of opponents (pure strategies from 2.3)
on RWS and RPS Arena. This is a straightforward rein-
forcement learning problem and we should expect all of
the agents to do well. Figure 4 presents the results. We
report the average reward at a training step with confidence
intervals of 0.95, averaged over 6 independent runs. In-
deed, all agents learn to defeat the pure strategies, although
differences in data efficiency and final performance are sig-
nificant. The clear winner is OPRE mix PG, which is the
top agent in both games. Interestingly, Baseline CC is not
performing better than the off-the-shelf Baseline, despite
having access to concealed information in the critic. OPRE
performs almost as well as its mix PG version on RPS Arena,
but is weaker on RWS. Notice, how early on OPRE is more
data-efficient than the Baseline on RWS, but has worse final
performance. Overal, OPRE agents benefit from using con-
cealed information to guide their policy search, but regular
OPRE suffers from bias on the basic version of the domain.
Figure 5 provides a dissection of one episode against a rock
pure strategy, where we visualise evolution of the policy
over options p(z). This visualisation clearly illustrates how
OPRE deliberately investigates the field to gain information
on opponent. The information is then reflected in p(z),
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which initiates a response behaviour.
5.3. Generalisation to hold-out
Now we turn to measuring generalisation by testing agents
trained in self-play against the held-out pure strategies.
Agents have not encountered the hold-out before and have
to generalise. Here by self-play we mean the following
setup: for each agent architecture, we initialise 6 agents of
that architecture using a different random seed; the agents
then compete against each other, sampled for a match at
random. All seeds learn simultaneously, agents of different
architecture do not play against each other. To reduce the
variance and safeguard against (un)lucky runs, we run this
procedure 5 times and average the results over the total of
30 agents. Figure 6 shows the generalisation reward curves.
The difference between different agents is now stark, with
some failing to generalise almost completely. Both base-
lines perform barely above chance (zero). OPRE has the
best generalisation, followed by OPRE mix PG with half of
its score.
Notice, however, that even OPRE recovers only a part of its
return magnitude, compared to exploiting the hold-out di-
rectly (Figure 4). To investigate this gap further we present
win rates, instead of return for both the exploitation and the
generalisation cases. Figure 7 shows the probability of a
victory for an agent in RWS (episodes always end after a
confrontation), while Figure 8 presents an average amount
of victories in a confrontation for RPS Arena (an episode
can have multiple confrontations). OPRE recovers most of
its victories even when generalising from self-play, while
none of the baselines manage to move significantly above
the performance of a random agent. What gives rise to the
difference between return and victory rate is the value of
winning a confrontation. To maximise the return against
a pure strategy, say rock, the agent has to collect as much
paper as possible and not a single other resource. This is
the strategy that is learnt by agents trained to exploit the
hold-out directly. OPREs trained in self-play are more con-
servative, winning confrontations by a small margin. They
do understand the fundamental, game-theoretic structure of
the game, which allows them to win fights, but pursue an
overall more conservative policy, since in self-play they face
a much stronger adversary - themselves. This confirms that
OPRE successfully extracts the underlying non-transitive
reward structure and uses it for generalisation.
5.4. Ablations
In this section we evaluate several ablations of OPRE and
baselines, to assess where the improvements come from.
We focus on the generalisation to the hold-out set of agents
trained in self-play on RWS. Each experiment answers a par-
ticular question and corresponds to a curve in Figure 9. First,
we allow the gradients from pi to flow into q(z) to check if
isolating q(z) from policy gradient and learning it purely
from the value function and KL link to p(z) facilitates credit
assignment (OPRE q-grad). To check if the benefit comes
from using a mixture model for the policy, we introduce
PureMix, which has the same factorised policy structure as
OPRE, but uses standard policy gradient to learn it. Next,
we verify if adding the auxiliary task (Jaderberg et al., 2016)
of predicting opponents’ inventories would be sufficient for
the baseline to match OPRE’s performance (Baseline aux).
We check if having a mixture value function alone, without
a hierarchical policy, is enough to achieve good generali-
sation. To this end we introduce Baseline CC fact, which
has the same factorised value function in the critic as OPRE.
We also estimate p(z) from the agent’s own observation and
use KL(q||p) as a regulariser, to stay as close to OPRE as
possible. As Figure 9 demonstrates, all the ablations fall
significantly short of the full model.
5.5. Direct agent tournament
The zero-sum, two-player setting of RWS allows us to com-
pare different agents in the most direct way – by playing
them against each other. The experiments in Section 5.3
have generated 120 individual agents (30 per agent archi-
tecture). In this Section we are going to look at the pay-off
matrix (see appendix for full matrix) generated by playing
all of those agents against each other and held-out pure
strategies (about 20 million games in total). The top 16
agents are OPRE (including 3 OPRE mixed PG). In Fig-
ure 10b we plot a pay-off matrix between architectures—a
mean pay-off when playing a random agent of one archi-
tecture against another, and again OPRE comes out on top.
This confirms that OPRE generalises well not only to a
hold-out set of pure strategies but also to other architectures
trained in self-play.
Now we take a deeper look at the pay-off matrix. Consider a
meta-game, defined by the pay-off matrix. Figure 10a shows
agents weights in the Nash equilibrium of the meta-game.
Again, all but one of agents in the Nash are OPRE and OPRE
mixed PG. We would like to note here, that Nash equilibria
are not unique thereby membership in one should not be
used as proof of success, but it is still a positive sign. Notice
that the pay-off matrix has a lot of structure in the OPRE
vs OPRE block, i.e. there is no single agent that dominates
the population as most agents win against some and lose
against the others. We verify this observation quantitatively
by measuring the effective diversity (Figure 11), proposed
in (Balduzzi et al., 2019). Effective diversity quantifies how
the best agents (those with support in the Nash) exploit
each other. If there is a dominant agent then it is zero.
This is the evidence towards OPRE producing more diverse
populations than standard architectures, and regular OPRE
more diverse than OPRE mix PG. This could be another
Options as responses
Episode starts
Bot collects rock
OPRE sees missing rock OPRE picks paper
OPRE tags the bot
OPRE moves left
p(z)
Figure 5. The plot presents the evolution of p(z)—policy over options—during one episode, where OPRE plays against a pre-trained rock
opponent (bot). Each colour corresponds an option (element of z) and the amount of colour to its weight. We render several important
moments in the game. OPRE and the bot start at opposite sides of the field. Bot proceeds to pick up the rock, while OPRE is moving
across the field. Once OPRE reaches the opposite side, it looks at rock field and at this moment the p(z) distribution changes drastically,
signifying the change in the policy. OPRE then proceeds to pick up paper and tag the bot.
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Figure 6. Generalisation to a hold-out set of pure strategies. Left:
RWS; Right: RPS Arena.
reason for better generalisation, as agents get to experience
a larger part of the strategy space in training.
5.6. Neural analyses
To test whether options are diverse low-level policies, we
analyse the behaviour of each individual option and ver-
ify that it represents some meaningful low-level behaviour,
whereby options differ significantly from each other. To
assess which behaviours are encoded by each option, we
replace the high-level policy p by a 1-hot vector that places
all weight on a single option. This transfers behavioural
control to a single option for the whole episode. We use pure
strategies from hold-out set as opponents. We repeat the
process for each option, rolling out 100 episodes per option
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Figure 7. Probability of winning on RWS at a training step. Left:
exploiting held-out set; Right: generalising to the held-out set
from self-play.
for each opponent (rock, paper, scissors) and record the fol-
lowing behavioural data: i) episode length ii) tagging events
iii) reward iv) collected resources v) scouting—amount of
steps where OPRE was directly observing the opponent. We
perform this analysis on an OPRE agent trained in self-play.
This has an analogue in experimental neuroscience where
we activate specific neurons in the living organism to assess
which behaviours these neurons encode. Figure 12 demon-
strates that indeed, OPRE’s options divide the strategy space
into meaningful components, including exploratory ones
(e.g., watch opponent), and exploitative ones (e.g., find and
collect paper, find and collect rock, find and tag opponent).
Specific behaviours can easily be elicited by activating the
corresponding option, and different options often encode
Options as responses
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Figure 8. Reporting average number of victories per episode of
RPS Arena at a training step. Left: Exploiting the held-out set;
Right: Generalising to the held-out set from self-play.
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Figure 9. OPRE and ablations on RWS. Generalisation to hold-out
set from self-play.
opposite behaviours (e.g., tag versus avoid tagging; collect
rock versus collect paper). Please see the appendix D for
more detailed analysis of scouting behaviour.
6. Conclusions
In this paper we investigated competitive multi-agent games
with concealed information and non-transitive reward func-
tion. We introduced OPRE – a new agent, which factorises
the value function over the latent representation of other
agents’ concealed information, and then reuses this latent
representation to factor the policy into options. It only
requires access to concealed information for learning the
value function during training and never uses it to generate
behaviour. Our experiments on two novel environments
demonstrated that OPRE has excellent generalisation from
self-play to a hold-out set of unseen opponents and in direct
agent tournament. The analysis of learnt options show that
they are meaningful and cover the space of strategies well.
Key insights of this paper can be, potentially, applied to
any domain where concealed information is available in
hindsight. As many domains fit this description, this may
have implications beyond multi-agent environments. One
exciting direction for future work is extending OPRE to
multi-task learning with concealed task definition, where
the agent has to both figure out which task it is solving as
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Figure 11. Effective diversity of agent populations on RWS. No-
tice that OPRE agents have high effective diversity compared to
baselines.
well as how to solve it. Another promising idea consists in
performing the factorisation not only on the value function,
but also on the environment dynamics through, for example,
generalised value functions (Sutton et al., 2011).
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